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Abstract
The distributed computation of Nash equilibria is assuming growing relevance in engineering where
such problems emerge in the context of distributed control. Accordingly, we present schemes for
computing equilibria of two classes of static stochastic convex games complicated by a parametric
misspecification, a natural concern in the control of large-scale networked engineered system. In both
schemes, players learn the equilibrium strategy while resolving the misspecification: (1) Monotone
stochastic Nash games: We present a set of coupled stochastic approximation schemes distributed
across agents in which the first scheme updates each agent’s strategy via a projected (stochastic) gradient
step while the second scheme updates every agent’s belief regarding its misspecified parameter using an
independently specified learning problem. We proceed to show that the produced sequences converge in
an almost-sure sense to the true equilibrium strategy and the true parameter , respectively. Surprisingly,
convergence in the equilibrium strategy achieves the optimal rate of convergence in a mean-squared
sense with a quantifiable degradation in the rate constant; (2) Stochastic Nash-Cournot games with
unobservable aggregate output: We refine (1) to a Cournot setting where we assume that the tuple
of strategies is unobservable while payoff functions and strategy sets are public knowledge through
a common knowledge assumption. By utilizing observations of noise-corrupted prices, iterative fixed-
point schemes are developed, allowing for simultaneously learning the equilibrium strategies and the
misspecified parameter in an almost-sure sense.
I. INTRODUCTION
In networked engineered systems, a common challenge lies in designing distributed control
architectures that ensure the satisfaction of a system-wide criterion in environments complicated
by nonlinearity, uncertainty, and dynamics. Such control-theoretic problems take on a variety of
forms and arise in a variety of networked settings, including networks of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), traffic networks, wireline and wireless communication networks, and energy systems,
Authors may be contacted at {jh double12@hotmail.com, udaybag@psu.edu (corrresponding author), meyn@ece.ufl.edu} and have been supported by NSF CAREER CMMI 1246887
and CMMI 1400217 (Shanbhag). Portions of section III are based on [1], respectively.
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2amongst others. These systems are often characterized by the absence of a designated central
entity that either has system-wide control or has access to global information. Consequently,
control is effected through distributed decision-making and local interactions that rely on limited
information. Game-theoretic approaches represent an avenue for designing such protocols. Game
theory has seen wide applicability in the social, economic, and engineered sciences in a largely
descriptive role. There has been immense recent interest in a prescriptive role [2] that considers
designing a game whose equilibria represent the solutions to the control problem of interest [3],
[4]; consequently, the distributed learning of Nash equilibria assumes immediate relevance in
the management of networked systems. Learning in Nash games has seen much study in the last
several decades [5]–[8]. In continuous strategy regimes, convex static games find significance in
engineered systems such as communication networks [9]–[12] and signal processing [13], [14].
An oft-used assumption in game-theoretic models requires that player payoffs are public
knowledge, allowing every player to correctly forecast the choices of his adversaries. As noted by
Kirman [15], a firm’s view of the game may be corrupted or misspecified in at least two distinct
ways in a Cournot setting where firms decide production levels given a price function: (i) a firm
might have a correct description of the price function but an incorrect estimate of its parameters;
and (ii) it may have an incorrect structure of the price function and incorrectly conclude that
prediction errors are a consequence of misspecified parameters. Kirman [15] considered such
a learning process, and showed that by observing true demand, the suggested learning process
guarantees that the firm strategies converge to the noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Further
inspiration may be drawn from studies by Bischi [16], [17], Szidarovsky [18], [19], amongst
others [20], where firms competing in a deterministic Nash-Cournot game learn a parameter of the
demand function while playing the game repeatedly. Note that an inherent assumption of a low
discount rate is imposed that discounts the future effect of any player’s strategies. Analogous
questions of optimization and estimation have also been studied by Cooper et al. [21] who
consider a joint process of forecasting and optimization in a regime where the underlying model
may be erroneous, demonstrating that the resulting revenues can systematically reduce over time.
When designing protocols for practical engineered systems, particularly in the absence of a
centralized controller, the associated parameters of the utility functions may often be misspec-
ified. For instance, in power market models that enlist Nash-Cournot models [22], [23], the
precise nature of the price function is assumed to be given. Similarly, the expected capacity or
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3availability of renewable generation assets is rarely known a priori. Similarly, when developing
distributed protocols for networked UAVs, the prescribed utility functions may rely on agent-
specific information that can only be learnt through observations. Faced by such challenges, our
goal lies in the development and analysis of general purpose algorithms that combine computation
of Nash equilibria with a learning phase to correct misspecification.
Motivation: This research is motivated by the absence of general-purpose distributed schemes
with asymptotic convergence and rate guarantees for learning equilibria in the face of imper-
fect information. Such problems emerge from stochastic generalizations of problems arising in
communication networks [10]–[12], [24], signal processing [13], [14], and power markets [22].
Accordingly, we present two distributed learning schemes in which agents learn their Nash
strategy while correcting the misspecification in their payoffs:
(1) Stochastic gradient schemes for stochastic Nash games: In Section II, we present a
distributed stochastic approximation framework in which every agent makes two projected gra-
dient updates: Every agent first updates its belief regarding the equilibrium strategy by using
the sampled gradient of its payoff function and subsequently updates its belief regarding the
misspecified parameter through a similar gradient update. The resulting sequence of equilibrium
and parameter estimates are shown to converge to their true counterparts in an almost sure sense.
Notably, we show that the mean-squared error of the equilibrium estimates converges to zero at
the optimal rate O(1/K) despite the presence of misspecification where K denotes the number
of gradient steps.
(2) Iterative fixed-point schemes for stochastic Nash-Cournot games: In Section III, we
consider a Cournot regime where aggregate output is unobservable and one parameter of the
demand function is misspecified. Under common-knowledge, agents develop an estimate of
aggregate output and the misspecified price function parameter by observing noisy prices. These
estimates allow developing an iterative fixed-point scheme that produces iterates that are shown to
converge to the Nash-Cournot equilibrium in an almost-sure sense. Additionally, firms learn the
true parameter in an almost-sure sense. The result can be extended to nonlinear price functions.
Remark: We make two remarks before proceeding. (a) First, in (1), the learning problem is
constructed independently of the computational problem through a set of observations while in
(2), the learning is affected by the computational step (akin to multi-armed bandit problems).
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4(b) Second, we comment on the sequential two-stage framework for resolving misspecification:
Step 1. Learn θ∗ Step 2. Compute x∗(θ∗),
where θ∗ is to be learnt and x∗(θ∗) is the (stochastic) Nash equilibrium, given θ∗. Unfortunately,
a sequential approach is complicated by several challenges. First, Step 1. needs to be completed
in a finite number of iterations, practically impossible for stochastic learning problems. Second,
premature termination of Step 1. leads to an erroneous estimate θˆ resulting in an incorrect Nash
equilibrium xˆ. In fact, in stochastic regimes, such avenues do not lead to asymptotic convergence
and at best provide approximate solutions. We observe from preliminary numerics reveal that
sequential schemes may perform orders of magnitude worse when compared with iterative fixed-
point schemes (see Table III).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we define and resolve a misspecified
stochastic Nash game and present a joint set of stochastic approximation schemes that collectively
allow for learning equilibria and resolving misspecification. In Section III, we develop iterative
fixed-point schemes in Cournot settings where aggregate output is unobservable. Empirical
studies and conclusions are provided in Sections IV and V, respectively. Throughout the paper,
‖x‖ denotes the Euclidean norm of a vector x, i.e., ‖x‖ =
√
xTx while ΠK(u) denotes the
Euclidean projection of u onto a set K, i.e., ΠK(x) , argminy∈K ‖x− y‖. A square matrix H
is said to be a P-matrix if every principal minor of H is positive. Similarly, H is a P0-matrix
if every principal minor of H is nonnegative.
II. GRADIENT-BASED SCHEMES FOR CONVEX GAMES
A. Problem description, assumptions and background
We consider an N−person stochastic Nash game in which the ith player solves Opt(x−i):
min
xi∈Ki
fi(x; θ
∗) , E[fi(x; θ∗, ξ)] (Opt(x−i))
where Ki ⊆ Rni , θ∗ ∈ Rm, ξ : Ω→ Rd defined on a probability space (Ω,Fx,Px), n =
∑N
i=1 ni,
and fi : Rn × Rm × Rd → R is a real-valued function in xi, x−i , (xj)Ni 6=j=1, θ and ξ. The
associated Nash equilibrium is given by a tuple x∗ = (x∗i )
N
i=1 where x
∗
i ∈ SOL(Opt(x∗−i)) for
i = 1, . . . , N, SOL(Opt(x∗−i)) denotes the solution of Opt(x−i) and under suitable convexity and
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5differentiability requirements (see (A1) below), by invoking [25, Th. 7.46], x∗ is a solution to a
stochastic variational inequality problem VI(K,F (·; θ∗)) where
K ,
N∏
i=1
Ki and F (x; θ) ,
(
Fi(x; θ)
)N
i=1
,
(
E[∇xifi(x; θ, ξ)]
)N
i=1
, (1)
respectively. It may be recalled that VI(K,F ) requires an x ∈ K satisfying
(y − x)TF (x; θ∗) ≥ 0, for all y ∈ K. (2)
Our overall goal lies in computing equilibria when θ∗ is unavailable or misspecified but can be
learnt by a possibly stochastic learning problem.
a) Learning scheme: In this section, we consider the estimation of θ∗ through the solution
of a suitably defined stochastic convex learning problem [26]:
min
θ∈Θ
g(θ) , E[g(θ; η)], (3)
where Θ ⊆ Rm is a closed and convex set, η : Λ → Rp is a random variable defined on a
probability space (Λ,Fθ,Pθ), and g : Θ × Rp → R is a real-valued learning metric function
(such as a regression metric constructed from a set of observations). Consequently, θ∗ may be
learnt through a stochastic gradient scheme of the form for k ≥ 0:
θk+1i := ΠΘ
(
θki − αki∇θg(θki ; ηki )
)
, i = 1, . . . , N. (4)
We emphasize that this learning problem is unrelated to the computational process and is a built
from a set of independently collected observations.
b) Distributed computational scheme: We consider a distributed stochastic approximation
scheme where the ith agent employs its belief regarding θ∗ to take a (stochastic) gradient step
for i = 1, . . . , N :
xk+1i := ΠKi
(
xki − γki∇xifi(xk; θki , ξki )
)
, k ≥ 0, (5)
where γki and ∇xifi(xk; θki , ξki ) denotes the steplength and sampled gradient used by player i at
step k. While a fully rational agent would always take a best response step, in stochastic settings,
the complexity of this step might be significant. In bounded rational regimes where computational
constraints are imposed, an alternative lies in computing other steps such as the gradient-response
(cf. [27], [28]). An alternative motivation arises from distributed control/optimization settings
where a “game” is designed whose equilibrium is a desirable solution to a suitably defined
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6control problem. Here, a distributed protocol for computing an equilibrium can be designed and
gradient-based approaches can be adopted (cf. [2]–[4]). We propose a game-theoretic extension
of that developed in [29], [30]. We may specify our joint simulation-based scheme for learning
and computation as follows:
Algorithm I: Gradient response and learning.
Let θ0i ∈ Θ, x0 ∈ K, {γki , αki } > 0 , for i = 1, . . . , N , and k = 0.
Step 1:
(Comp)xk+1i := ΠKi
(
xki − γki ∇xifi(xk; θki , ξki )
)
,
(Learn) θk+1i := ΠΘ
(
θki − αki∇θg(θki ; ηki )
)
,
 i = 1, . . . , N ; (6)
Step 2: if k > K¯, stop; else k := k + 1 and go to Step 1.
We now present the main assumptions employed in deriving convergence properties of Algorithm
I. (A1) enforces convexity assumptions that allow for deriving sufficient equilibrium conditions
given by VI(X,F ) while the monotonicity requirements on F allow for claiming the existence of
a unique equilibrium. Lipschitzian requirements of F aid in deriving subsequent convergence and
rate statements. Furthermore, a breadth of learning problems (such as regression, classification
etc. [26]) are convex. The requirements imposed by (A2) are standard in developing distributed
protocols while (A3) imposes assumptions on the conditional first and second moments common
in stochastic approximation literature [31]–[33].
Assumption 1 (A1): For i = 1, . . . , N , suppose the function fi(x; θ) is convex and continuously
differentiable function in xi for every x−i ∈
∏
j 6=iKj and every θ ∈ Θ. Furthermore, suppose
Θ is a closed, convex, and bounded set and for i = 1, . . . , N , Ki ⊆ Rni is a nonempty, closed,
convex and bounded set. Furthermore, suppose the following hold:(a) For every θ ∈ Θ, F (x; θ)
is both strongly monotone and Lipschitz continuous in x with constants µx and Lx; for every θ,
(F (x; θ)−F (y; θ))T (x− y) ≥ µx‖x− y‖2 and ‖F (x; θ)−F (y; θ)‖ ≤ Lx‖x− y‖; (b) For every
x ∈ K, F (x; θ) is Lipschitz continuous in θ with constant Lθ; (c) The function g(θ) is strongly
convex and continuously differentiable with Lipschitz continuous gradients in θ with convexity
constant µθ and Lipschitz constant Cθ, respectively; (∇g(θ1)−∇g(θ2))T (θ1−θ2) ≥ µθ‖θ1−θ2‖2,
and ‖∇g(θ1)−∇g(θ2)‖ ≤ Cθ‖θ1 − θ2‖.
Note that monotone Nash games include stable Nash games, a class of games for which a
range of evolutionary dynamics allow for convergence to Nash equilibria [34], [35].
Assumption 2 (A2): For i = 1, . . . , N , the ith agent knows only his objective fi and strategy
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7set Ki and the parameter set Θ. Furthermore, the vector x is assumed to be observable.
We define a new probability space (Z,F ,P), where Z , Ω×Λ, F , Fx×Fθ and P , Px×Pθ.
For i = 1, . . . , N , suppose wki , ∇xifi(xk; θki , ξki ) − ∇xifi(xk; θki ) and vki , ∇θg(θki ; ηki ) −
∇θg(θki ). Fk denotes the sigma-field generated by (x0, θ0) and errors (wl, vl) for l = 0, 1, · · · , k−
1, i.e., F0 = σ {(x0, θ0)} and Fk = σ
{
(x0, θ0),
(
(wl, vl), l = 0, 1, · · · , k − 1)} for k ≥ 1.
Assumption 3 (A3): (a) Unbiasedness: E[wki | Fk] = 0 and E[vki | Fk] = 0 a.s. for all k and
i; (b) Bounded second moments: E[‖wki ‖2 | Fk] ≤ ν2x and E[‖vki ‖2 | Fk] ≤ ν2θ a.s. for all k, i.
To construct distributed schemes requiring no coordination in terms of setting parameters, we
allow each agent to independently set steplengths and as long as a suitable relationship between
these steplengths holds, convergence follows. Specifically, the ith agent employs a diminishing
steplength sequence given by γki . Furthermore, we define γ
k
min , min1≤i≤N{γki } and γkmax ,
max1≤i≤N{γki } for all k. Similarly, we define αkmin , min1≤i≤N{αki } and αkmax , max1≤i≤N{αki }
for all k. Then, we can make the following assumptions on the steplengths of the algorithm.
Assumption 4 (Steplength requirements, A4): Let {γki } and {αki } be chosen such that: (a)∑∞
k=1 γ
k
min =∞,
∑∞
k=1(γ
k
max)
2 <∞, ∑∞k=1(αkmax)2 <∞; (b) limk→∞ γkmax−γkminγkmax = 0; (c) αkmin ≥
γkmaxL
2
θ/(µxµθ) for sufficiently large k, limk→∞
(αkmax)
2
γkmax
= 0.
Notice that (a)
∑∞
k=1 γ
k
min =∞ and (c) αkmin ≥ γkmaxL2θ/(µxµθ) for sufficiently large k implies
that
∑∞
k=1 α
k
min = ∞. A natural concern is whether the rule that relates the steplengths can be
implemented in a distributed fashion without coordination. We propose a rule, first suggested by
[36], in which every agent chooses a positive integer and the required coordination statement
holds. We view this as a protocol that may be employed for developing distributed schemes.
The next result ensures that for such a choice, the required assumptions hold [36].
Lemma 1 (Choice of steplength sequences): Let {γki } and {αki } be chosen such that γki =
1
(k+Ni)α
and αki =
1
(k+Mi)β
where Ni and Mi are positive integers and 12 < β < α < 1. Then,
(A4) holds.
We state three results (without proof) that will be employed in developing our convergence
statements, of which the first two are relatively well-known super-martingale convergence results
(cf. [37, Lemma 10, Pg. 49–50])
Lemma 2: Let sk be a sequence of nonnegative random variables adapted to σ-algebra Fk
and such that E[sk+1 | Fk] ≤ (1 − uk)sk + βk for all k ≥ 0 almost surely, where 0 ≤ uk ≤ 1,
βk ≥ 0, and ∑∞k=0 uk =∞, ∑∞k=0 βk <∞ and limk→∞ βkuk = 0. Then, sk → 0 in an a.s. sense.
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8Lemma 3: Let sk, uk, βk and γk be non-negative random variables adapted to σ-algebra Fk. If
E[sk+1 | Fk] ≤ (1 + uk)sk − γk + βk for all k ≥ 0 a.s. where
∑∞
k=0 u
k <∞ and ∑∞k=0 βk <∞
both hold a.s., then {sk} is convergent in an a.s. sense and ∑∞k=0 γk <∞ a.s.
Finally, we present a contraction result reliant on monotonicity and Lipschitzian requirements.
Lemma 4: (cf. [38, Theorem 12.1.2, Pg. 1109]) Let H : K → Rn be a strongly monotone
map over K with constant µ, and Lipschitz continuous over K with constant L. If q ,√
1− 2µγ + γ2L2, then for any γ > 0, we have the following: ‖ΠK(x − γH(x)) − ΠK(y −
γH(y))‖≤ ‖x− y − γ(H(x)−H(y))‖ ≤ q‖x− y‖.
B. Convergence Analysis
We begin with a contraction statement for the sequence of iterates produced by Algorithm I.
Lemma 5: Suppose (A1), (A2), (A3) and (A4) hold. Let {xk, θk} be computed via Algorithm
I. For any k ≥ 0, E [‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ ζk‖xk−x∗‖2 +βk, where ζk = 1−γkmaxµx+2(γkmax−
γkmin)Lx + 2(γ
k
max)
2L2x and βk = (2(γ
k
max)
2L2θ + γ
k
maxL
2
θ/µx)
∑N
i=1 ‖θki − θ∗‖2 +N(γkmax)2ν2x.
We may now prove our main a.s. convergence result for the sequences {xk} and {θk}.
Theorem 1: Suppose (A1), (A2), (A3) and (A4) hold. Let {xk, θk} be computed via Algorithm
I. Then, xk a.s.−→ x∗ and θki a.s.−→ θ∗ as k →∞ for all i.
Finally, we conclude this section with a non-asymptotic error bound that demonstrates that
the joint scheme displays the optimal rate of O(1/K) in mean-squared error.
Theorem 2: Suppose (A1), (A2) and (A3) hold. Suppose γki = λx,i/k and α
k
i = λθ,i/k. Let
E[‖Fi(xk; θki ) + wki ‖2] ≤ Mx2/N and E[‖∇θg(θki ) + vki ‖2] ≤ M2θ for all xk ∈ K and θki ∈ Θ.
Let {xk, θk} be computed via Algorithm I. Then, there exist constants Qθ and Qx,θ such that
the following hold after K iterations: E[‖θKi − θ∗‖2] ≤ Qθ/K and E[‖xK − x∗‖2] ≤ Qx,θ/K.
Remark: Surprisingly, misspecification does not lead to a degeneration in the rate of convergence
of the mean-squared error with respect to that for perfectly specified stochastic Nash games
(cf. [39]) but does lead to a worsening of the constant. In addition, the lack of consistency
across steplengths leads to a further growth in this constant.
III. ITERATIVE FIXED-POINT SCHEMES FOR MISSPECIFIED NASH-COURNOT GAMES
Inspired by the analysis of misspecified Nash-Cournot games [16]–[19], [40], we develop
an iterative fixed-point scheme. We introduce the problem in Section III-A and describe and
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9analyze the algorithm in Sections III-B and III-C, respectively. A comparison between gradient
and iterative fixed-point schemes is provided in Section III-D and we conclude with an extension
to nonlinear prices in Section III-E.
A. Problem description, assumptions and background
We consider a Nash-Cournot game wherein fi(x) , ci(xi) − p(X; a∗, b∗)xi, where X ,∑N
i=1 xi, xi and ci(xi) denote the scalar output and cost function associated with firm i while
Ki denotes the strategy set of firm i. Suppose the price function p(X; a∗, b∗) is defined as
p(X; a∗, b∗) , (a∗ − b∗X) , (7)
Note that a∗ represents the “choke price” at which demand plummets to zero, while b∗ represents
the price elasticity of demand. Inspired by [17], [40], we assume that either a∗ or b∗ is unknown
and firm i’s belief of this unknown parameter is denoted by θi. We also define θ∗ as the true
value of the misspecified parameter of the price function. A natural extension is where both
parameters are unknown and this will require two or more observations at each epoch, rather
than a single observation of noisy prices.
Case 1 (Learning a∗): We assume that firms know b∗ but are unaware of a∗ (θ∗ = a∗); the ith
firm harbors a belief on a∗ denoted by θi and estimates the aggregate output X by Xi, then the
ith firm’s price estimate and the true noise-corrupted prices are defined as follows:
p(Xi; θi, 0) , θi − b∗Xi, (Estimate)
p(X; θ∗, ξ) , (θ∗ + ξ)− b∗X. (True price)
(8)
Case 2 (Learning b∗): Distinct from Case 1, firms know a∗ and estimate b∗ as θi (θ∗ = b∗)
while the true price is corrupted by noise scaled by the aggregate output. Firm i’s price estimate
and the true prices are defined as follows:
p(Xi; θi, 0) , a∗ − θiXi, (Estimate)
p(X; θ∗, ξ) , a∗ − (θ∗ + ξ)X. (True price)
(9)
The next assumption formalizes these two cases.
Assumption 5 (A5): Either (A5a) or (A5b) holds:
(A5a) Firms know b∗ but not a∗ (θ∗ = a∗) and the price is defined by (8).
(A5b) Firms know a∗ but not b∗ (θ∗ = b∗) and the price is defined by (9).
November 18, 2018 DRAFT
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Furthermore, the random variable ξ is defined by ξ : Λ → R, (Λ,Fθ,Pθ) is the associated
probability space and ξ1, . . . , ξk are i.i.d. random variables with mean zero for all k.
Our assumption on costs is a special case of (A1).
Assumption 6 (A6): The cost function ci(xi) is a convex and continuously differentiable
function in xi over Ki with Lipschitz continuous gradients with constant Mi. Furthermore,
K1, . . . , KN are closed, convex, and bounded sets. Suppose the estimator set Θ is a compact
convex set in R+ given by [δ,∆] and 0 < δ < θ∗ + ξk < ∆ for all k.
As forwarded by [41], the notion of “common knowledge” in game theory extends beyond
agents having access to information. We assume that firms cannot observe aggregate output and
derive an estimate, relying on the knowledge of the cost functions and strategy sets of their
competitors, as assured through a common knowledge assumption. This assumption is often
employed in games (see [5]). Collectively, these two assumptions are captured by (A7).
Assumption 7 (A7): The common knowledge assumption holds with regard to ci(xi) and Ki
for i = 1, . . . , N. Furthermore, aggregate output is unobservable.
Several motivating examples exist in the literature detailing common knowledge; these include
instances provided by [42] (the barbecue problem) and [43] (the department store problem),
amongst others. While our results are agnostic to applications, it is worth emphasizing that such
assumptions often hold when agents need to make their assets and costs public through suitable
filings, such as in utility-based regulation (power, gas, water, etc.). This is often the case in
regulatory settings (cf. [44, Pg. 78-79]). Common knowledge assumptions immediately hold
when a game is designed [2]–[4] and agents can be endowed with the requisite knowledge. A
select number of results will rely on boundedness of strategy sets, as specified by (A6).
B. Description of algorithm
Our goal lies in developing schemes for learning equilibria and misspecified parameters.
Unfortunately, since neither the aggregate output nor θ∗ are observable, gradient/best-response
schemes cannot be directly implemented. However, under (A7), every firm knows the cost
functions and strategy sets of its competitors, allowing for computing the best response of all
firms, based on an estimate of θ∗ and the aggregate. By using the discrepancy between estimated
and observed prices, each firm may construct improved estimates of the misspecified parameter.
This model, while aligned, with that suggested by [17], [40] enjoys distinctions at several
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levels; specifically, we allow for constrained problems with nonlinear cost functions with noisy
price observations arising from possibly nonlinear price functions. Let xki = (x
k
i1, · · · , xkiN) for
i = 1, · · · , N and Xki =
∑N
j=1 x
k
ij where x
k
ij denotes firm i’s conjecture of firm j’s output at
the kth period and Xki denote firm i’s estimate of aggregate output. Note that X
k
i is maintained
as strictly positive by assuming that at least one of the strategy sets requires strictly positive
output while the true aggregate Xk is given by Xk ,
∑N
j=1 x
k
jj . The proposed algorithm relies
on simultaneous updates of xk+1i and θ
k+1
i , which requires first defining ϑ
k
i ϑ¯
k
i , and θ̂
k
i .
under (A5a) : p(Xk; θ∗, ξk) = (θ∗ + ξk)− b∗Xk, ϑki , p(Xk; θ∗, ξk) + b∗Xki , (10)
under (A5b) : p(Xk; θ∗, ξk) = a∗ − (θ∗ + ξk)Xk, ϑki , (a∗ − p(Xk; θ∗, ξk))/Xki , (11)
ϑ¯k+1i =
kϑ¯ki + ϑ
k+1
i
k + 1
, (12)
θ̂k+1i (θ
k+1
i ) ,
1
k + 1
θk+1i +
k
k + 1
ϑ¯ki . (13)
Subsequently, we show that ϑ¯ki = θ
∗ + (
∑k
j=1 ξ
j)/k (see (38)).
(a) Update of xk+1i1 , . . . , x
k+1
iN : Under (A7), given a sequence {k} ↓ 0, firm i computes a Nash
equilibrium, contingent on its choice of θk+1i , through a fixed-point of the best-response map:
xk+1ij = argmin
xk+1ij ∈Kj
[cj(x
k+1
ij )− p(Xk+1i ; θ̂k+1i (θk+1i ), 0)xk+1ij +
1
2
k‖xk+1ij ‖2], j = 1, . . . , N.
(BRxij(x
k+1
i,−j, θ
k+1
i ; ϑ¯
k
i ))
(b) Update of θk+1i : Firm i defines the difference between the price observed at the kth step
p(Xk; θ∗, ξk) and its estimate p(Xk+1i ; θ̂
k+1
i , 0) as p˜
k+1
i (θ
k+1
i , X
k+1
i ):
p˜k+1i (θ
k+1
i , X
k+1
i ) :=
p(X
k+1
i ; θˆ
k+1
i (θ
k+1
i ), 0)− p(Xk; θ∗, ξk), under (A5a)
p(Xk; θ∗, ξk)− p(Xk+1i ; θˆk+1i (θk+1i ), 0). under (A5b)
Suppose tk+1i (X
k+1
i ) denotes a solution to
p˜k+1i (θ
k+1
i , X
k+1
i ) + 
kθk+1i = 0,
where the regularization term kθk+1i is introduced to ensure uniqueness of (15) (See Prop. 1).
By invoking the functional form of p(Xk+1i ; θˆ
k+1
i (θ
k+1
i ), 0), the following holds:
tk+1i (X
k+1
i ) =
[(k + 1)(p(X
k; θ∗, ξk) + b∗Xk+1i )− kϑ¯ki ]/(1 + (k + 1)k), under (A5a)
[(k + 1)(a∗ − p(Xk; θ∗, ξk))− kϑ¯kiXk+1i ]/(Xk+1i + (k + 1)k). under (A5b)
(14)
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Suppose δ and ∆ are lower and upper bounds of Θ, respectively. We may then update θk+1i as
follows:
θk+1i =

δ, if tk+1i (X
k+1
i ) < δ
tk+1i (X
k+1
i ), if δ ≤ tk+1i (Xk+1i ) ≤ ∆
∆. if tk+1i (X
k+1
i ) > ∆
(BRθi (X
k+1
i ; ϑ¯
k
i ))
Equivalently, we may state the above as θk+1i = Π[δ,∆](t
k+1
i (X
k+1
i )).
Algorithm II: Iterative fixed-point and learning.
Given a sequence {k} ↓ 0 where k > 0 for all k, and γx, γθ ; k := 0;
∑N
j=1 x
0
jj = X
0; p(X0; θ∗, ξ0) := a∗ − b∗X0; 0 > 0; Player
i selects ϑ¯0i for i = 1, . . . , N .
Step 1. For i = 1, . . . , N , if Xk+1i =
∑N
j=1 x
k+1
ij , then {xk+1i1 , . . . , xk+1iN , θk+1i } is a solution to the following system:
xk+1ij solves BR
x
ij(x
k+1
i,−j , θ
k+1
i ; ϑ¯
k
i ), j = 1, . . . , N
θk+1i solves BR
θ
i (X
k+1
i ; ϑ¯
k
i ).
(15)
Step 2. For i = 1, . . . , N , ϑk+1i is defined as per (10) or (11) and ϑ¯
k+1
i is updated as follows:
ϑ¯k+1i =
kϑ¯ki + ϑ
k+1
i
k + 1
. (16)
Step 3. If k > K¯, stop; else k := k + 1 and go to Step 1.
C. Analysis of noise-corrupted iterative fixed-point schemes
In this subsection, we analyze our iterative fixed-point scheme and partition the discussion
as follows: (i) First, we provide a brief discussion as to why the update specified by (15) can
be succinctly captured by the solution to a single variational equality problem; (ii) Second, we
provide a brief sketch of the results to follows; and (iii) We provide the convergence theory.
(i) Equivalence of (15) to a fixed-point problem: First, any best response of a convex
optimization problem is equivalent to a solution of a suitable variational inequality problem [45]:[
y∗i ∈ argmin
yi∈Yi
di(yi)
]
⇔ [y∗i solves VI(Yi,∇yidi)] ,
where di is a convex function in yi over a convex set Yi. In fact, given a collection of functions
di(yi; y−i) that are convex in yi over convex sets Yi for all y−i with y−i , (yj)i 6=j , the coupled
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best response is equivalent to the solution of a single variational inequality problem [45]:
[
y∗1 ∈ argmin
y1∈Y1
d1(y1, y−1)
]
⇔ [y∗1 solves VI(Y1,∇y1d1(·, y∗−1))]
...[
y∗N ∈ argmin
yN∈YN
dN(yN , y−N)
]
⇔ [y∗N solves VI(YN ,∇yNdN(·, y∗−N))]

⇔ y∗ solves VI(Y , F ),
where Y , ∏Ni=1 Yi and F (y) = (∇yidi(yi, y−i))Ni=1. Finally, any solution to a variational
inequality problem is a fixed point of a suitably defined problem where γ is a positive scalar:
[y∗ solves VI(Y , F )]⇔ [y∗ = ΠY(y∗ − γF (y∗))] .
By using this avenue, the problem (BRxij(x
k+1
i,−j, θ
k+1
i ; ϑ¯
k
i )) is the set of coupled fixed-point
problems:
xk+1ij = ΠKj
(
xk+1ij − γ
(
∇xijfj(xk+1i ; θ̂k+1i (θk+1i )) + kxk+1ij
))
, j = 1, . . . , N, (17)
where fj(xk+1i ; θ̂
k+1
i (θ
k+1
i )) = cj(x
k+1
ij )− p(Xk+1i ; θ̂k+1i (θk+1i ))xk+1ij . Similarly, (BRθi (Xk+1i ; ϑ¯ki ))
can be stated as the following fixed-point problem:
θk+1i = ΠΘ
(
θk+1i − γ
(
p˜k+1i (θ
k+1
i , X
k+1
i ) + 
kθk+1i
))
. (18)
Before proceeding, we shed some light on this equivalence. Suppose the root of p˜k+1i (θ
k+1
i , X
k+1
i )+
kθk+1i = 0 is denoted by t
k+1
i . Then from (18), this implies that t
k+1
i = ΠΘ
(
tk+1i
)
. Consequently,
if tk+1i ∈ Θ , [δ,∆], then θk+1i = tk+1i while θk+1i = δ( or ∆), if tk+1i < δ( or > ∆). But this
is equivalent to (BRθi (X
k+1
i ; ϑ¯
k
i )).
We define zk+1i , (xk+1i1 , . . . , xk+1iN , θk+1i ). Then, zk+1i solves the coupled fixed-point problem
(17) – (18) if and only if zk+1i solves VI(Z, F k+1+kI) where
Z ,
N∏
i=1
Ki ×Θ and F k+1(zk+1i ) =

∇xi1f1(xk+1i ; θ̂k+1i (θk+1i ))
...
∇xiNfN(xk+1i ; θ̂k+1i (θk+1i ))
p˜k+1i (θ
k+1
i , X
k+1
i )
 .
In summary, the coupled best response scheme (15) is equivalent to the coupled fixed-point
problem (17) – (18), which is also equivalent to the variational inequality problem VI(Z, F k+1+kI).
(ii) Sketch of results: We first show that the coupled best response scheme given by (15) always
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admits a unique solution (Prop. 1). Furthermore, each player solves a parametrized form of this
system in which the parametrization is shown to be identical (See (38)). Theorem 3 shows that
the sequence xki , θ̂
k
i } → {x∗, θ∗} as k → ∞ in an a.s. sense. This proof relies on showing that
θ̂ki → θ∗ as k → ∞ in an a.s. sense. Then, if the solution xk+1i (θ̂k+1i ) is a continuous function
in θ̂k+1i (Prop. 3), we may conclude that limk→∞ x
k+1
i (θ̂
k+1
i ) = x
k+1
i (θ
∗) = x∗, where the last
equality follows from noting that the correctly specified Nash game has a unique solution.
(iii) Convergence theory:
Proposition 1: Suppose (A5), (A6) and (A7) hold. Suppose k > 0 for k ≥ 0. Given
p(Xk; θ∗, ξk) and {ϑ¯ki }Ni=1, under either (A5a) or (A5b), the solution to (15) is a singleton.
Having shown that the coupled best response scheme has a unique solution, we proceed to
show a Lipschitzian property on the solution set of (15) with respect to the parameter θ (Prop.
3). Before that, we provide some preliminary results. The strong monotonicity and Lipschitz
continuity of the mapping F (x) can be easily shown under (A6).
Lemma 6: Consider the mapping F (x) defined by (1) and suppose (A6) holds. Then F (x) is
a strongly monotone Lipschitz continuous mapping.
This allows for claiming the existence and uniqueness of a Nash-Cournot equilibrium when the
price function is affine.
Proposition 2: Consider a Nash-Cournot game in which the ith player solves (Opt(x−i)) and
the price is determined by (7). Furthermore, suppose (A6) holds. Then, the associated Nash-
Cournot game admits a unique equilibrium.
Now, we state the Lipschitzian property on the solution set of (15). This proof is inspired by a
related result (See [46, Lemma 3].)
Proposition 3: Consider a VI(K,F (·; θ)) where F (x; θ) is strongly monotone in x over K
for all θ ∈ Θ, Lipschitz continuous in x for all θ ∈ Θ and Lipschitz continuous in θ for all
x ∈ K. Then, the following hold: (a) If x(θ) denotes the solution of VI(K,F (·; θ)), then x(θ)
is Lipschitz continuous in θ for all θ ∈ Θ. (b) Given an  > 0, if x(θ, ) denotes the solution of
VI(K,F (·; θ) + I), then x(θ, ) is Lipschitz continuous in θ and .
If F k+1x (x
k+1
i ; θ̂
k+1
i ) =
(
∇xijfj(xk+1i ; θ̂k+1i )
)N
j=1
, then the solution xk+1i to (BRxij(x
k+1
i,−j, θ
k+1
i ; ϑ¯
k
i ))
solves the variational inequality problem VI(
∏N
i=1Ki, F
k+1
x (·; θ̂k+1i ) + kI). Based on Lemma 6
and Prop. 3, xk+1i = x
k+1
i (θ̂
k+1
i , 
k) is a continuous function of (θ̂k+1i , 
k).
We may now show that the iterative fixed-point scheme produces a sequence of iterates that
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converges almost surely to the true equilibrium and allows for learning the true parameter.
Theorem 3 (Global convergence of iterative fixed-point scheme): Suppose (A5), (A6) and (A7)
hold. Let {xki , θˆki } be computed via Algorithm II for i = 1, . . . , N . Then θˆki → θ∗ and xki → x∗
almost surely for i = 1, . . . , N , where x∗ is a solution of the variational inequality (2).
Remark: We emphasize that this scheme requires each agent to effectively solve a suitably
defined variational inequality problem, similar to the centralized problem seen in [17], [40].
Such schemes more closely tied to best-response schemes than the gradient-based approaches
presented in the previous section. In fact, this particular best-response problem requires solving
a variational inequality problem with a P-mapping (See proof of Prop. 1), a class of problems
that has been studied extensively (cf. [45, Ch. 10,11]).
D. Comparison between gradient and fixed-point schemes
To better understand the distinctions between the two schemes, we recap several differences:
(i) Assumptions: Gradient-based schemes can accommodate general convex objectives but
require that the gradient map be strongly montone and Lipschitz continuous. Furthermore, a
general misspecified player objective can be accommodated under suitable assumptions. Iterative
fixed-point schemes focus on stochastic Nash-Cournot games (rather than general stochastic Nash
games) and require convex costs but allow for either linear or nonlinear inverse demand functions.
Notably, players can learn either a∗ or b∗ at any given point while a vector of parameters may
be learnt in the context of gradient-based algorithms for stochastic Nash games.
(ii) Nature of algorithm: Gradient-based schemes require that each player computes a projected
gradient step in the x and θ space while the iterative best-response schemes require each player
solves a parametrized variational inequality and updates a suitably defined average at every step.
(iii) Convergence and rate statements: The gradient-based schemes allow for claiming a.s.
convergence, convergence in mean-squared sense, and derive rate statements. In particular, we
show that in such regimes the rate of convergence is optimal and no degradation arises from
misspecification. On the other hand, in the context of the iterative best-response schemes, we
may show a.s. convergence, while rate statements remain a focus of future research.
November 18, 2018 DRAFT
16
E. Extension to nonlinear price functions
We now consider a generalization to nonlinear prices defined as follows:
p(X; θ∗, ξ) ,
a
∗ − b∗Xσ + ξ,
a∗ − (b∗ + ξ)Xσ.
(19)
This nonlinear price function has been examined by [36] where a discussion of the strict
monotonicity of the associated mapping is presented (Lemma 7(a)). Specifically, the equilibrium
of the Nash-Cournot game are captured by VI(K,F ) where F (x) is defined as
F (x) ,
(
c′i(xi)− (a∗ − b∗Xσ) + σb∗Xσ−1xi
)N
i=1
. (20)
In the next result, the mapping F (x) is strongly monotone for all x ∈ K if∇F (x) is a diagonally
dominant matrix for all x ∈ K.
Lemma 7: Consider the mapping F (x) defined in (20). Suppose (A6) holds, N < 3σ−1
σ−1 and
1 < σ ≤ 3. Then the following hold:
(a) F (x) is a strictly monotone mapping over K;
(b) Suppose X ≥ η for some η > 0, then F (x) is a strongly monotone mapping over K.
Directly deriving a Lipschitzian statement on F (x; θ) in terms of θ is not easy when the price
function has the prescribed nonlinear form; instead, by noting that ∇F (x) is bounded when x
is bounded, allows for proving such a statement. Next, we provide a corollary of Proposition 3
where such a property is derived.
Corollary 1: Consider a VI(K,F (·; θ)) where F (x; θ) is strongly monotone in x over K for
all θ ∈ Θ, and Lipschitz continuous in θ for all x ∈ K. Also, there is a constant R > 0, such
that ‖∇F (x; θ)‖ ≤ R for all x ∈ K and θ ∈ Θ. Given an  > 0, if x(θ, ) denotes the solution
of VI(K,F (·; θ) + I), then x(θ, ) is Lipschitz continuous in θ and .
Proposition 4: Suppose (A5a) holds. Consider the mapping F (x) defined in (20) and suppose
(A6) holds. Suppose X ≥ η for some η > 0 and all x ∈ K, where X = ∑Ni=1 xi. If N < 3σ−1σ−1
and 1 < σ ≤ 3, then the following hold:
(a) If x(θ) denotes the solution of VI(K,F (.; θ)), then x(θ) is Lipschitz continuous in θ for
all θ ∈ Θ.
(b) Given an  > 0, if x(θ, ) denotes the solution of VI(K,F (.; θ) + I), then x(θ, ) is
Lipschitz continuous in θ and .
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We may now show that the fixed-point problem yields a unique solution.
Proposition 5: Suppose (A6) and (A7) hold. Let the price be given by (19). If N < 3σ−1
σ−1 and
1 < σ ≤ 3, then given pk(ξk) and {θ¯ki }Ni=1, the solution to (15) is a singleton.
By leveraging Propositions 4 and 5, the convergence of the iterative fixed-point scheme can
be claimed under the caveat that the aggregate output is always bounded away from zero, as
stated by the next result, whose proof is similar to Theorem 3 and is omitted.
Corollary 2: Suppose (A6) and (A7) hold. Suppose X ≥ η for some η > 0 and all x ∈ K,
where X =
∑N
i=1 xi. Let {xki , θˆki } be computed via Algorithm II for i = 1, . . . , N . Suppose a
unique solution to the fixed-point problem (15) can be obtained, given pk(ξk) and {θ¯ki }Ni=1 for
each k ≥ 0. Then, θˆki → θ∗ almost surely for i = 1, . . . , N and xki → x∗ almost surely for
i = 1, . . . , N , where x∗ is a solution of the variational inequality (2).
We conclude this section with an observation. If one used a more widely used estimation
technique such as a least-squares estimation then it remains unclear if almost-sure convergence
statements can always be claimed since least-squares estimators generally converge in a weaker
sense while stronger statements may be available for linear regression (see [47]). In effect,
a scheme that combines a least-squares estimation technique with a strategy update, while
convergent, may not possess desirable almost-sure convergence properties. While, we examine
nonlinear Nash-Cournot games in this section, we also show that such claims hold for more
general aggregative Nash games. However, it should be emphasized that extending this avenue
to Nash games where the associated variational map is non-monotone may lead to challenges.
In particular, what are perfectly reasonable schemes for a subclass of Nash games may not be
supported by similar asymptotic guarantees when the structural properties of the problem do not
satisfy some key requirements.
IV. NETWORKED NASH-COURNOT GAMES
In this section, we apply the developed algorithms on a class of networked Nash-Cournot
games described in Section IV-1. In Section IV-2, we apply the distributed gradient-based
schemes for purposes of learning equilibria and the misspecified parameters when aggregate
output is observable, while in Section IV-3, we apply the proposed iterative fixed-point schemes
when aggregate output is unobservable. Note that the simulations were carried out on Matlab
R2009a on a laptop with Intel Core 2 Duo CPU (2.40GHz) and 2GB memory. The comple-
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mentarity solver PATH, developed by [48], was utilized for solving the variational inequality
problems that arose in implementing the algorithms.
1) Problem description: We consider a setting where there are N firms competing over a
W -node network. Firm f may produce and sell its good at node i (denoted by gfi and sfi,
respectively), where f = 1, . . . , N and i = 1, . . . ,W . We assume that for a given firm f , the
cost of generating gfi units of power at node i is linear and is given by cfigfi. Furthermore, the
generation level associated with firm f is bounded by its production capacity, which is denoted
by capfi. The aggregate sales of all firms at node i is denoted by Si, and the nodal price of
power at node i, assumed to be a linear function of Si, is defined as pi(Si) , a∗i − b∗iSi, where
a∗i and b
∗
i are node-specific positive price function parameters. A given firm can produce at
any node and then sell at different nodes, provided that the aggregate production at all nodes
matches the aggregate sales at all nodes for each firm. For simplicity, we assume that there is
no transportation cost between any two nodes, and that there is no limit of sales at any node.
Then, the resulting problem faced by firm f can be stated as
(Firm(x−f )) max
sfi≥0, capfi≥gfi≥0
{
W∑
i=1
(pi(Si)sfi − cfigfi) :
W∑
i=1
(sfi − gfi) = 0
}
. (21)
The resulting Nash-Cournot equilibrium is given by {x∗f}Nf=1 where x∗f is a solution to (Firm(x∗−f ))
for f = 1, . . . , N . Prices are assumed to be corrupted by noise, in one of two ways:
pi(Si; ξi) = (a
∗
i + ξi)− b∗iSi, (22)
pi(Si; ξi) = a
∗
i − (b∗i + ξi)Si. (23)
Note that firm f either has to learn θ∗ , (a∗i )Wi=1 when prices are given by (22) or learn θ∗ ,
(b∗i )
W
i=1 when prices are given by (23). In the remainder of this section, let
a∗ , (a∗1, . . . , a∗W )T , b∗ , (b∗1, . . . , b∗W )T , θ∗ , (θ∗1, . . . , θ∗W )T , ξ∗ , (ξ∗1 , . . . , ξ∗W )T , xi ,
(s1i, s2i, . . . , sNi, g1i, g2i, . . . , gNi)
T , and x , (xT1 , . . . , xTW )T . Note that this problem is employed
as a motivating example since Cournot-based models have been used extensively in their analysis
(cf. [22], [23]). Naturally, a range of rationality assumptions can be imposed on firms in power
markets, but given the sheer size of the problem and the repeated nature of competition (in most
power markets, firms compete as many as 5–6 times every hour in the setting of prices) with
relatively minor changes occuring in demand/availability over a short period.
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2) Learning with observation of the aggregate output: In this subsection, we assume that
every firm knows the aggregate output at each node, and employ the learning schemes proposed
in Section II-A. Suppose, the nodal price function is given by (22) and suppose Algorithm I (the
gradient-based distributed learning scheme), proposed in Section II-A, is employed for learning
parameters and computing equilibria. Suppose firms have generated a price at each node. We
use pi = a∗i + ξi − b∗iSi to denote the price. Each firm will solve the following (regularized)
problem to estimate a∗i and b
∗
i :
min
{ai,bi},θ∈Θ
g(θ), where g(θ) , E
[
(ai − biSi − pi)2 + λa2i + λb2i
]
.
Suppose Si is as per a uniform distribution and is specified by Si ∼ U [0, a0i /b0i ], where a0i and b0i
are initial estimates of a∗i and b
∗
i . Suppose, the noise ξi is distributed as per a uniform distribution
and is specified by ξi ∼ U [−a∗/2, a∗/2]. Suppose the steplength sequence {γki } and {αki } are
chosen according to Lemma 1: γki =
1
(k+Ni)α
and αki =
1
(k+Mi)β
, where α = 0.8 and β = 0.6
and Ni and Mi are randomly chosen from an interval [1, 200]. The algorithm was terminated at
k = 10000. Table I shows the scaled errors of the learning scheme.
TABLE I
DISTRIBUTED GRADIENT SCHEME
N W
Learning a∗ and b∗
‖xk−x∗‖
1+‖x∗‖
‖aˆk−a∗‖
1+‖a∗‖
‖bˆk−b∗‖
1+‖b∗‖
5 1 7.2×10−7 2.9×10−2 4.7×10−2
5 2 3.3×10−4 3.3×10−2 5.3×10−2
5 3 7.4×10−5 3.3×10−2 5.3×10−2
5 4 1.2×10−2 4.2×10−2 6.8×10−2
5 5 1.4×10−2 3.2×10−2 8.5×10−2
10 2 1.3×10−4 3.4×10−2 3.7×10−2
10 4 1.1×10−2 2.6×10−2 8.4×10−2
10 6 2.4×10−2 3.6×10−2 8.6×10−2
10 8 2.8×10−2 3.0×10−2 6.4×10−2
10 10 3.1×10−2 4.1×10−2 5.4×10−2
TABLE II
ITERATIVE FIXED-POINT SCHEME
N W
Learning a∗ Learning b∗
maxf
‖xkf−x
∗‖
1+‖x∗‖ maxf
‖aˆkf−a
∗‖
1+‖a∗‖ maxf
‖xkf−x
∗‖
1+‖x∗‖ maxf
‖bˆkf−b
∗‖
1+‖b∗‖
5 1 6.0×10−3 5.4×10−3 2.3×10−3 1.5×10−3
5 2 1.9×10−3 1.6×10−3 9.1×10−4 7.7×10−4
5 3 1.4×10−3 2.7×10−3 7.8×10−4 1.4×10−3
5 4 7.8×10−3 2.8×10−3 2.0×10−3 1.0×10−3
5 5 1.0×10−3 2.5×10−3 1.2×10−2 2.2×10−3
10 2 2.0×10−3 1.9×10−3 1.2×10−3 1.2×10−3
10 4 1.1×10−2 4.2×10−3 1.5×10−2 9.4×10−4
10 6 1.8×10−3 0.8×10−3 3.0×10−4 1.5×10−3
10 8 2.0×10−3 2.7×10−3 1.3×10−3 8.5×10−4
10 10 1.1×10−3 3.5×10−3 3.8×10−4 7.0×10−4
3) Learning without observing the aggregate output: In this subsection, we examine how the
schemes perform when firms are ignorant of aggregate output at each node while a common
knowledge assumption is assumed to hold.
Suppose, the nodal price function is given by (22) or (23) and suppose Algorithm II (the
iterative fixed-point scheme), proposed in Section III-A, is employed for learning parameters
and computing equilibria. Suppose, the noise ξ is distributed as per a uniform distribution and
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is specified by ξ ∼ U [−θ∗/2, θ∗/2]. Each run comprised of 10000 steps learning a∗ and 50000
steps for learning b∗. Table II shows the scaled errors of the learning scheme while Figures 1(a)
and 1(b) illustrate the scaled errors of the learning scheme when the number of steps, denoted
by k, increases for learning x∗ and a∗, respectively. Analogous figures for learning x∗ and b∗
are provided (see Figures 2(a) and 2(b)).
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Fig. 1. Computing x∗ and learning a∗ (ξ ∼ U [−θ∗/2, θ∗/2], N = 10)
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Fig. 2. Computing x∗ and learning b∗ ( ξ ∼ U [−θ∗/2, θ∗/2], N = 10)
TABLE III
LEARNING x∗ AND b∗ IN A STOCHASTIC REGIME WHEN N = 5 AND W = 1, STOPPING AT STEP k = 10000
(a) ξ ∼ U [− b∗/2, b∗/2]
Sequential Simultaneous
Bound ‖x
k−x∗‖
1+‖x∗‖
‖bˆk−b∗‖
1+‖b∗‖
max ‖xkf−x
∗‖
1+‖x∗‖
max ‖bˆkf−b
∗‖
1+‖b∗‖
32.3664 2.1×10−1 1.2×10−1 4.9×10−3 3.3×10−3
64.7329 1.2×10−1 1.0×10−1 5.0×10−3 3.3×10−3
97.0993 5.5×10−1 8.8×10−1 5.0×10−3 3.3×10−3
129.4658 7.4×10−1 1.1 5.1×10−3 3.4×10−3
161.8322 1.2 7.9×10−1 5.1×10−3 3.4×10−3
(b) ξ ∼ U [−R,R]
Sequential Simultaneous
R
‖xk−x∗‖
1+‖x∗‖
‖bˆk−b∗‖
1+‖b∗‖
max ‖xkf−x
∗‖
1+‖x∗‖
max ‖bˆkf−b
∗‖
1+‖b∗‖
b∗/5 7.5×10−2 4.8×10−2 1.9×10−3 1.2×10−3
b∗/4 9.6×10−2 6.0×10−2 2.4×10−3 1.6×10−3
b∗/3 1.3×10−1 8.0×10−2 3.2×10−3 2.2×10−3
b∗/2 2.1×10−1 1.2×10−1 4.9×10−3 3.3×10−3
b∗/1 5.3×10−1 2.3×10−1 9.9×10−3 6.7×10−3
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In Table III(a), we raise the upper bounds of the strategy sets of all agents and compare
a sequential scheme with our iterative fixed-point scheme. In the sequential counterpart, we
employ 10, 000 steps of stochastic approximation-based learning followed by 10, 000 steps of
computation. It is seen that the error from the sequential scheme increases proportionally to the
bound, while the error associated with our simultaneous scheme does not change significantly.
Table III(b) shows that when increasing the variance of the noise makes the difference in errors
between the sequential and simultaneous schemes more pronounced. Consequently, for the same
effort, it can be seen that the simultaneous scheme performs far better to the sequential scheme,
particularly when the variance of the noise grows.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Nash games, a broadly applicable paradigm for modeling strategic interactions in noncooper-
ative settings, have emerged as immensely useful in the context of distributed control problems.
Yet, the development of distributed protocols for learning equilibria may be complicated by
several challenges: (i) Agents may have an incomplete specification of payoffs; (ii) Agents may
be unavailable to observe the actions of their counterparts; and finally, (iii) Observations may
be corrupted by noise. Accordingly, this paper is motivated by developing schemes for learning
equilibria and resolving misspecification (such as in the price functions). We consider two specific
settings as part of our investigation and apply these techniques on a class of networked Nash-
Cournot games. First, we consider convex static stochastic Nash games characterized by a suitable
monotonicity property in which agent payoffs are parameterized by a misspecified vector. We
consider a framework that combines (stochastic) gradient steps with a stochastic approximation
step that attempts to learn the parameter. In such settings, we provide asymptotic statements
that show that agents may learn equilibria and the true parameters in an almost sure sense. In
addition, we provide non-asymptotic error bounds that demonstrate that the rate of convergence
is not impaired by the presence of learning. Second, we refine our statements to a Cournot
regime where we assume common knowledge holds but aggregate output is unobservable. In
such a setting, we construct a learning scheme in which firms maintain a belief of the aggregate
output and the misspecified price function parameter. After each step, these beliefs are updated
by employ fixed-point steps and by leveraging the disparity between estimated and (noisy)
observed prices. We proceed to show that in the limit, every firm learns the true Nash-Cournot
equilibrium strategy in an almost-sure sense. Additionally, every firm learns the correct value of
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the misspecified parameter in an almost-sure sense. Yet much remains to be studied, including
weakening monotonicity requirements on the map and boundedness requirements on the strategy
sets. It also remains to be investigated as to whether learning can allow for weakening the
common knowledge assumption.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 5: Since x∗i = ΠKi(x
∗
i−γki Fi(x∗; θ∗)), by the nonexpansivity of the Euclidean
projector:
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤
N∑
i=1
(‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + (γki )2‖Fi(xk; θki )− Fi(x∗; θ∗)‖2 + (γki )2‖wki ‖2)
− 2
N∑
i=1
γki (x
k
i − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θki )− Fi(x∗; θ∗))
− 2
N∑
i=1
γki (x
k
i − x∗i )Twki + 2
N∑
i=1
(γki )
2(Fi(x
k; θki )− Fi(x∗; θ∗))Twki . (24)
RHS of (24) ≤ ‖xk − x∗‖2 + (γkmax)2
N∑
i=1
‖Fi(xk; θki )− Fi(x∗; θ∗)‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
term1
+(γkmax)
2‖wk‖2
−2
N∑
i=1
γki (x
k
i − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θki )− Fi(xk; θ∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
term2
−2
N∑
i=1
γki (x
k
i − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θ∗)− Fi(x∗; θ∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
term3
− 2
N∑
i=1
γki (x
k
i − x∗i )Twki + 2
N∑
i=1
(γki )
2(Fi(x
k; θki )− Fi(x∗; θ∗))Twki . (25)
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By (A1) and using inequality ‖a + b‖2 ≤ 2‖a‖2 + 2‖b‖2, term 1 in (25) may be bounded by
leveraging the Lipschitz continuity of F (x; θ):
term1 ≤ ‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2(γkmax)2
N∑
i=1
‖Fi(xk; θki )− Fi(xk; θ∗)‖2 + 2(γkmax)2
N∑
i=1
‖Fi(xk; θ∗)− Fi(x∗; θ∗)‖2
≤ ‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2(γkmax)2
N∑
i=1
‖F (xk; θki )− F (xk; θ∗)‖2 + 2(γkmax)2‖F (xk; θ∗)− F (x∗; θ∗)‖2
≤ (1 + 2(γkmax)2L2x)‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2(γkmax)2L2θ
N∑
i=1
‖θki − θ∗‖2. (26)
By (A1), term 2 in (25) can be bounded by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, Ho¨lder’s inequality
and the Lipschitz continuity of F (x; θ):
term2
≤ −2
N∑
i=1
γki (x
k
i − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θki )− Fi(xk; θ∗)) ≤ 2γkmax
N∑
i=1
‖xki − x∗i ‖‖Fi(xk; θki )− Fi(xk; θ∗)‖
≤ 2γkmax‖xk − x∗‖
√√√√ N∑
i=1
‖Fi(xk; θki )− Fi(xk; θ∗)‖2
≤ 2γkmax‖xk − x∗‖
√√√√ N∑
i=1
‖F (xk; θki )− F (xk; θ∗)‖2
≤ 2γkmaxLθ‖xk − x∗‖
√√√√ N∑
i=1
‖θki − θ∗‖2 ≤ γkmaxµx‖xk − x∗‖2 + γkmax
L2θ
µx
N∑
i=1
‖θki − θ∗‖2, (27)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that 2ab ≤ a2 + b2. Term 3 in (25) can be
bounded by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and γki ≤ γkmax for all i: term3 ≤−2
∑N
i=1 γ
k
i (x
k
i −
x∗i )
T (Fi(x
k; θ∗)−Fi(x∗; θ∗)) = −2
∑N
i=1 γ
k
max(x
k
i −x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θ∗)−Fi(x∗; θ∗))− 2
∑N
i=1(γ
k
i −
γkmax)(x
k
i − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θ∗) − Fi(x∗; θ∗)) ≤ −2γkmax
∑N
i=1(x
k
i − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θ∗) − Fi(x∗; θ∗)) +
2(γkmax − γkmin)
∑N
i=1 ‖xki − x∗i ‖‖Fi(xk; θ∗) − Fi(x∗; θ∗)‖. Proceeding further, we may leverage
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Ho¨lder’s inequality, the Lipschitz continuity of F (x; θ) and (A1) to obtain the following:
− 2γkmax
N∑
i=1
(xki − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θ∗)− Fi(x∗; θ∗))
+ 2(γkmax − γkmin)
N∑
i=1
‖xki − x∗i ‖‖Fi(xk; θ∗)− Fi(x∗; θ∗)‖
≤ −2γkmax(xk − x∗)T (F (xk; θ∗)− F (x∗; θ∗)) + 2(γkmax − γkmin)‖xk − x∗‖‖F (xk; θ∗)− F (x∗; θ∗)‖
≤ −2γkmaxµx‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lx‖xk − x∗‖2. (28)
Combining (24) with (25), (26), (27), and (28), we obtain
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ (1 + 2(γkmax)2L2x)‖xk − x∗‖2 − γkmaxµx‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lx‖xk − x∗‖2
+ 2(γkmax)
2L2θ
N∑
i=1
‖θki − θ∗‖2 + γkmaxL2θ/µx
N∑
i=1
‖θki − θ∗‖2 + (γkmax)2‖wk‖2
− 2
N∑
i=1
γki (x
k
i − x∗i )Twki + 2
N∑
i=1
(γki )
2(Fi(x
k; θki )− Fi(x∗; θ∗))Twki
=
(
1− γkmaxµx + 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lx + 2(γkmax)2L2x
) ‖xk − x∗‖2
+ (2(γkmax)
2L2θ + γ
k
maxL
2
θ/µx)
N∑
i=1
‖θki − θ∗‖2 + (γkmax)2‖wk‖2
− 2
N∑
i=1
γki (x
k
i − x∗i )Twki + 2
N∑
i=1
(γki )
2(Fi(x
k; θki )− Fi(x∗; θ∗))Twki .
By taking conditional expectations and by recalling that E[wki | Fk] = 0 and E[‖wki ‖2 | Fk] ≤ ν2x,
we obtain that E
[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ ζk‖xk − x∗‖2 + βk, where ζk = 1− γkmaxµx + 2(γkmax −
γkmin)Lx + 2(γ
k
max)
2L2x and βk = (2(γ
k
max)
2L2θ + γ
k
maxL
2
θ/µx)
∑N
i=1 ‖θki − θ∗‖2 +N(γkmax)2ν2x.
Proof of Theorem 1: From Lemma 5, the following holds for every k:
E
[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ (1− γkmaxµx + 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lx + 2(γkmax)2L2x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, ζk
‖xk − x∗‖2
+ (2(γkmax)
2L2θ + γ
k
maxL
2
θ/µx)
N∑
i=1
‖θki − θ∗‖2 +N(γkmax)2ν2x︸ ︷︷ ︸
,βk
.
(29)
By invoking the fixed-point property given by θ∗ = ΠΘ(θ∗ − αki∇θg(θ∗)) (see [45]) and the
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non-expansivity of the Euclidean projector, we may derive the following bound on ‖θk+1i −θ∗‖2:
‖θk+1i − θ∗‖2 ≤ ‖θki − θ∗i − αki (∇θg(θki )−∇θg(θ∗))− αki vki ‖2
= ‖θki − θ∗i − αki (∇θg(θki )−∇θg(θ∗))‖2 + (αki )2‖vki ‖2 − 2αki (θki − θ∗i − αki (∇θg(θki )−∇θg(θ∗)))Tvki .
By taking conditional expectations, recalling that E[vki | Fk] = 0 and using Lemma 4, we obtain
E[‖θk+1i − θ∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ ‖θki − θ∗ − αki (∇θg(θki )−∇θg(θ∗))‖2 + (αki )2E[‖vki ‖2 | Fk]
≤ (1− 2αki µθ + (αki )2C2θ )‖θki − θ∗‖2 + (αki )2ν2θ
≤ (1− 2αkminµθ + (αkmax)2C2θ )‖θki − θ∗‖2 + (αkmax)2ν2θ .
(30)
Next, by adding (29) and (30) and by invoking (A4), we obtain the following:
E
[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk]+ E[ N∑
i=1
‖θk+1i − θ∗‖2 | Fk
]
≤ (1− γkmaxµx + 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lx + 2(γkmax)2L2x) ‖xk − x∗‖2
+ (1− 2αkminµθ + (αkmax)2C2θ + 2(γkmax)2L2θ + γkmaxL2θ/µx)
N∑
i=1
‖θki − θ∗‖2 +N(γkmax)2ν2x +N(αkmax)2ν2θ
≤ (1− γkmaxµx + 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lx + 2(αkmax)2L2xµ2xµ2θ/L4θ)‖xk − x∗‖2
+ (1− γkmaxL2θ/µx + (αkmax)2C2θ + 2(αkmax)2µ2xµ2θ/L2θ)
N∑
i=1
‖θki − θ∗‖2 +N(γkmax)2ν2x +N(αkmax)2ν2θ
≤ (1− υkγkmax + β(αkmax)2)
(
‖xk − x∗‖2 +
N∑
i=1
‖θki − θ∗‖2
)
+ δk,
where the second inequality results from invoking A4(c) through which −µθαkmin ≤ −γkmaxL2θ/µx
and υk = min{µx − 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lx/γkmax, L2θ/µx}, β = max{2L2xµ2xµ2θ/L4θ, C2θ + 2µ2xµ2θ/L2θ},
and δk = N(γkmax)
2ν2x + N(α
k
max)
2ν2θ . To show the non-summability of (υkγ
k
max − β(αkmax)2),
we consider two cases: (i) If µx ≤ L2θ/µx then υk = µx − 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lx/γkmax and for
some K, υk ≥ µx/2 when k > K. Consequently,
∑
k>K υkγ
k
max ≥
∑
k>K µxγ
k
max/2 = ∞; (ii)
Alternately, if µx > L2θ/µx, then for some K, υk = L
2
θ/µx when k > K and
∑
k>K υkγ
k
max =∑
k>K L
2
θ/µxγ
k
max =∞. Since αkmax is square summable from (A4), we conclude that
∑∞
k=0(υkγ
k
max−
β(αkmax)
2) =∞. In addition, we have that
lim
k→∞
δk
υkγkmax − β(αkmax)2
= lim
k→∞
N(γkmax)
2ν2x +N(α
k
max)
2ν2θ
υkγkmax − β(αkmax)2
= lim
k→∞
N(γkmax)ν
2
x +N
(αkmax)
2
γkmax
ν2θ
υk − β(αkmax)2/γkmax
= 0,
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where the last equality results from noting that limk→∞ γkmax = 0, limk→∞(α
k
max)
2/γkmax = 0 and
limk→∞ υk = c > 0. Then, by invoking the super-martingale convergence theorem (Lemma 2),
we have that ‖xk − x∗‖2 +∑Ni=1 ‖θki − θ∗‖2 → 0 a.s. as k → ∞, which implies that xk → x∗
and θki → θ∗ a.s. as k →∞ for all i.
Proof of Theorem 2: Throughout this proof, λx,min , min
1≤i≤N
{λx,i}, λx,max , max
1≤i≤N
{λx,i},
λθ,min , min
1≤i≤N
{λθ,i}, λθ,max , max
1≤i≤N
{λθ,i}. Furthermore, 2µθλθ,min > 1, µxλx,max − 2(λx,max −
λx,min)Lx > 1, Ak , 12‖xk − x∗‖2, and ak , E[Ak]. Then, Ak+1 may be bounded as follows by
using the non-expansivity of the Euclidean projector:
Ak+1 =
1
2
N∑
i=1
‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 =
1
2
N∑
i=1
‖ΠKi(xki − γki∇xifi(xk; θki , ξki ))− ΠKi(x∗i )‖2
≤ 1
2
N∑
i=1
‖xki − γki∇xifi(xk; θki , ξki )− x∗i ‖2 ≤
1
2
N∑
i=1
‖xki − x∗i − γki (Fi(xk; θki ) + wki ))‖2
= Ak +
1
2
N∑
i=1
(γki )
2‖Fi(xk; θki ) + wki ‖2 −
N∑
i=1
γki (x
k
i − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θki ) + wki ). (31)
Note that E[(xki−x∗i )Twki ]= E[E[(wki )T (xki − x∗i ) | Fk]] = 0. By taking expectations on both sides
of (31) and by invoking the bounds E[‖Fi(xk; θki ) +wki ‖2] ≤M2/N and E[‖∇θg(θki ) + vki ‖2] ≤
M2θ , it follows that
ak+1 ≤ ak + 1
2
(γkmax)
2M2 −
N∑
i=1
γki E[(xki − x∗i )TFi(xk; θki )]. (32)
By (27) and (28), the last term (including the negative sign) in (32) can be bounded by
−
N∑
i=1
γki E[(xki − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θki )− Fi(xk; θ∗))]
−
N∑
i=1
γki E[(xki − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θ∗)− Fi(x∗; θ∗))]−
N∑
i=1
γki E[(xki − x∗i )TFi(x∗; θ∗)]
≤ −
N∑
i=1
γki E[(xki − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θki )− Fi(xk; θ∗))]−
N∑
i=1
γki E[(xki − x∗i )T (Fi(xk; θ∗)− Fi(x∗; θ∗))]
≤ γkmaxµxak + γkmaxL2θ/(2µx)
N∑
i=1
E[‖θki − θ∗‖2]− 2γkmaxµxak + 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lxak. (33)
Combining (32) and (33), we get
ak+1 ≤ (1− γkmaxµx + 2(γkmax − γkmin)Lx)ak +
1
2
(γkmax)
2M2 + γkmaxL
2
θ/(2µx)
N∑
i=1
E[‖θki − θ∗‖2].
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Suppose αki = λθ,i/k for all i. Since the function g(θ) is strongly convex, we can use the standard
rate estimate (cf. inequality (5.292) in [25]) to get the following
E[‖θki − θ∗‖2] ≤
Qθ
k
, (34)
where Qθ , max{λ2θ,maxM2θ (2µθλθ,min − 1)−1, maxi E[‖θ0i − θ∗‖2]} with λθ,min > 1/(2µθ).
Suppose γki = λx,i/k, allowing us to claim the following:
ak+1 ≤
(
1− µxλx,max − 2(λx,max − λx,min)Lx
k
)
ak +
λ2x,max
2k2
(
M2 +
L2θNQθ
λx,maxµx
)
,
By assuming that µxλx,max − 2(λx,max − λx,min)Lx > 1, the result follows by observing that
E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤ Qx,θ
k
, where Qx,θ , max
{
λ2x,maxM
2+λ2x,maxL
2
θNQθ
(µxλx,max−2(λx,max−λx,min)Lx−1) ,E[‖x0 − x∗‖2]
}
.
Proof of Proposition 1: It suffices to show that given p(Xk; θ∗, ξk) and {ϑ¯ki }Ni=1, the variational
inequality VI(Z, F k+1+kI) has a unique solution for each i. Now, for simplicity, we ignore the
superscript k for all variables. Given p, ϑ¯i, i and k, let H(zi) denote the Jacobian matrix ∇F (zi)
of F at zi ∈ Z . We will proceed to show that H(zi) is a P-matrix for all zi ∈ Z˜ in part (a) and
a P0-matrix for all zi ∈ Z˜ in part (b) where Z ⊂ Z˜ and Z˜ is a rectangle. Then, by invoking
Proposition 3.5.9 in [45], the associated mapping F is P-mapping on Z˜ in part (a) and a P0-
mapping on Z˜ in part (b). Consequently, by Theorem 3.5.15 in [45], the regularized variational
inequality VI(Z, F k+1+kI) has a unique solution in both parts (a) and (b). Specifically, we
employ a rectangular Z˜ defined as Z˜ , [0,∞)N ×Θ, where Θ is a compact set in (0,∞). (a)
Given zi ∈ Z˜ , let Hi denote H(zi). Then, Hi =
 Ai B
C D
, where Ai = b∗(I + eeT ) + Ei,
B = − 1
k+1
e, C = −b∗eT , D = 1
k+1
, e denotes the column of ones in RN , Ei is an N×N diagonal
matrix with c′′j (xij) as its jth diagonal entry. Since, the nonnegativity of c
′′
j (xij) follows from the
convexity of costs, Ei is a nonnegative diagonal matrix and is therefore positive semidefinite.
Recall that the sum of a diagonal positive semidefinite matrix and a P-matrix is a P-matrix
and it suffices to show that Hi is a P-matrix when Ei = 0. This amounts to showing that the
principal minors of H are positive.
Since Ai and D are P-matrices, we only consider the principal submatrix Hα of Hi, where
α ⊆ {1, . . . , N} is a nonempty index set and Hα is given by Hα ,
 Aα Bα
Cα D
 , where
Aα = b
∗(Inα + e
nα(enα)T ), Bα = − 1k+1enα , Cα = −b∗(enα)T , and Inα and enα denote the
identity matrix and the column of ones in Rnα×nα and Rnα , respectively, with nα = |α|. Since
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A−1α =
1
b∗
(
Inα − 1nα+1enα(enα)T
)
, we have CαA−1α Bα =
1
k+1
(enα)T
(
Inα − 1nα+1enα(enα)T
)
enα
= 1
k+1
(
nα − n2αnα+1
)
= 1
k+1
(
nα
nα+1
)
. It follows that D − CαA−1α Bα = 1k+1 − 1k+1
(
nα
nα+1
)
=
1
k+1
(
1
nα+1
)
> 0. Since det(Aα) > 0, we have det(Hα) = det(Aα) det (D − CαA−1α Bα) > 0 for
all α ⊆ {1, . . . , N} with α 6= ∅. Therefore, H is a P-matrix.
(b) Analogous to our approach for (a), we consider a matrix Hi, given by Hi = ∇F (zi). Then,
Hi =
 Ai Bi
Ci Di
, where Ai = bˆi(I + eeT ) + Ei, Bi = 1k+1(xi + (eTxi)e), Ci = bˆieT , and
Di =
1
k+1
(eTxi), where bˆi = 1k+1bi +
k
k+1
b¯i, xi = (xi1, . . . , xiN)T , e denotes the column of ones
in RN , and Ei is an N × N diagonal matrix with c′′j (xij) as its jth diagonal entry. Recall that
the sum of a diagonal positive semidefinite matrix and a P0-matrix is a P0-matrix. As in (a), it
suffices to show that H is a P0-matrix when Ei = 0.
Since Ai and Di are P0-matrices, we restrict our attention to the principal submatrix Hα of Hi,
where α ⊆ {1, . . . , N} is a nonempty index set, and Hα is given by Hα ,
 Aα Bα
Cα Di
 , where
Aα = bˆi(Inα + e
nα(enα)T ), Bα =
1
k+1
(xα + (e
Txi)e
nα), Cα = bˆi(e
nα)T , and Inα and enα denote
the identity matrix and the column of ones in Rnα×nα and Rnα , respectively, with nα = |α|.
Then, the following hold: (1) If bˆi = 0, then Aα = 0 and Cα = 0, which implies det(Hα) = 0;
(2) If bˆi > 0, then A−1α =
1
bˆi
(Inα − 1nα+1enα(enα)T ). So, we have
CαA
−1
α Bα =
1
k + 1
(enα)T
(
Inα −
1
nα + 1
enα(enα)T
)
(xα + (e
Txi)e
nα)
=
1
k + 1
((enα)T − nα
nα + 1
(
enα)T
)
(xα + (e
Txi)e
nα) =
1
(k + 1)(nα + 1)
(
(enα)Txα + nα(e
Txi)
)
.
=⇒ Di − CαA−1α Bα =
1
k + 1
eTxi − 1
(k + 1)(nα + 1)
(
(enα)Txα + nα(e
Txi)
)
=
1
(k + 1)(nα + 1)
(
eTxi − (enα)Txα
) ≥ 0.
Since det(Aα) > 0, we have det(Hα) = det(Aα) det (Di − CαA−1α Bα) ≥ 0.
Therefore, det(Hα) ≥ 0 for all nonempty α ⊆ {1, . . . , N}, implying that Hi is a P0-matrix.
Proof of Lemma 6: Let g(x) = (c′1(x1), . . . , c
′
N(xN))
T and e = (1, . . . , 1)T . Then, we have
F (x) = g(x) + b∗(x+Xe)− a∗e, where X = ∑Ni=1 xi. Note that g(x) is monotone in x. Thus,
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we have for x, y ∈ K
(F (x)− F (y))T (x− y) = (g(x)− g(y))T (x− y) + b∗(x− y)T (x− y) + b∗(X − Y )eT (x− y)
≥ b∗(x− y)T (x− y) + b∗(X − Y )T (X − Y ) ≥ b∗‖x− y‖2.
This implies that F (x) is strongly monotone in x with constant b∗. Note that g(x) is Lipschitz
continuous on K with constant M , where M , maxi{Mi}. The Lipschitz continuity of F (x)
is easily shown:
‖F (x)− F (y)‖ = ‖g(x)− g(y)‖+ b∗‖x− y‖+ b∗‖(X − Y )e‖
≤M‖x− y‖+ b∗‖x− y‖+ b∗‖eeT‖‖x− y‖ = L‖x− y‖,
where L = M + b∗ + b∗‖eeT‖. It follows that F (x) is Lipschitz continuous with constant L.
Proof of Proposition 2: From Lemma 6, the associated variational inequality VI(K,F ) has a
strongly monotone mapping F (x) over K. Consequently, VI(K,F ) admits a unique solution [45].
Proof of Proposition 3: Consider θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ and let Fi(·) := F (·, θi), i = 1, 2. Let xi be a
solution of VI(K,Fi) for i = 1, 2. By the assumption of strong monotonicity on the map, we
have that
(x1 − x2)T (F1(x1)− F1(x2)) ≥ c‖x2 − x1‖2, (35)
for some constant c > 0 (assumed to be independent of θ1). Since x1 is a solution of VI(K,F1),
it follows that (x2 − x1)TF1(x1) ≥ 0, which together with (35) implies
(x2 − x1)TF1(x2) ≥ c‖x2 − x1‖2. (36)
We may express (36) as (x2− x1)T (F1(x2)−F2(x2) +F2(x2)) ≥ c‖x2− x1‖2. Now since x2 is
the solution of VI(K,F2), it follows that (x2 − x1)TF2(x2) ≤ 0. Consequently we obtain
‖x2 − x1‖‖F1(x2)− F2(x2)‖ ≥ (x2 − x1)T (F1(x2)− F2(x2)) ≥ c‖x2 − x1‖2. (37)
By Lipschitz continuity of F (x, θ) (assuming it is uniform in x), we have that ‖F1(x2, θ1) −
F2(x2, θ2)‖ ≤ Lθ‖θ2 − θ1‖, and hence by (37) Lθ‖x2 − x1‖‖θ2 − θ1‖ ≥ c‖x2 − x1‖2. It follows
that ‖x2 − x1‖ ≤ Lθc−1‖θ2 − θ1‖.
To show (b), let x(θi, j) be the solution of VI(K,Gij(·)), where Gij(·) = F (·, θi) + jI. We
begin by applying the triangle inequality to obtain that ‖x(θ1, 1) − x(θ2, 2)‖ ≤ ‖x(θ1, 1) −
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x(θ2, 1)‖+‖x(θ2, 1)−x(θ2, 2)‖. Since Gi1 is strongly monotone in x with constant c+ 1 and
Lipschitz continuous in θ with constant Lθ, respectively, we have that the first term is bounded
by Lθ(c+ 1)−1‖θ2 − θ1‖ as a result from part (a). Before proceeding, the Lipschitz continuity
of F (x; θ) + I with respect to  can be obtained as
‖(F (x; θ) + 2x)− (F (x; θ) + 1x)‖ ≤ ‖x‖‖1 − 2‖ ≤ D‖1 − 2‖.
Since G2j is strongly monotone in x with constant c + j and Lipschitz continuous in  with
constant D, respectively, we have that the second term is bounded by D(c + 1)−1‖2 − 1‖ as
a result from part (a). Consequently, we obtain that
‖x(θ1, 1)− x(θ2, 2)‖ ≤ Lθ(c+ 1)−1‖θ2 − θ1‖+D(c+ 1)−1‖2 − 1‖.
The Lipschitz continuity of x(θ, ) with respect to its parameters follows.
Proof of Theorem 3: Suppose k ≥ 0. At the kth iteration, p˜ki is a function of θˆk+1i , which
is a function of ϑ¯ki . Consequently, the fixed-point problem (15) is a function of ϑ¯
k
i . Since (15)
has a unique solution (Prop. 1), it follows that xi,· = xj,· for i 6= j and xkij = xkjj . Therefore,
Given p(Xk; θ∗, ξk) and {ϑ¯ki }Ni=1,the solution (xk+1i , θk+1i ) to (15) satisfies xk+1ij = xk+1jj for all
i, j. Thus, for all k ≥ 0 and all i, we have that
p(Xk; θ∗, ξk) =
(a
∗ + ξk)− b∗∑Nj=1 xkjj = (a∗ + ξk)− b∗∑Nj=1 xkij, under (A5a),
a∗ − (θ∗ + ξk)∑Nj=1 xkjj = a∗ − (θ∗ + ξk)∑Nj=1 xkij, under (A5b).
Since for all k ≥ 0 and all i,
ϑki =
p(X
k; θ∗, ξk) + b∗Xki , under (A5a),
(a∗ − p(Xk; θ∗, ξk))/Xki , under (A5b).
we have ϑki = θ
∗+ξk for all i. As a result, after k iterative fixed-point steps, we obtain k samples
{θ∗+ξ1, . . . , θ∗+ξk} of the estimated parameter. Since for all k ≥ 0 and all i, ϑ¯k+1i = kϑ¯
k
i +ϑ
k+1
i
k+1
,
the sample mean of the estimated parameter is given by ϑ¯ki , i.e.,
ϑ¯ki =
∑k
l=1(θ
∗ + ξl)
k
. (38)
Therefore, ϑ¯ki → θ∗ a.s. as k →∞, which implies by the boundedness of {θki } that for all i
θ̂k+1i =
1
k + 1
θk+1i +
k
k + 1
ϑ¯ki → θ∗ a.s. as k →∞,
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by the strong law of large numbers. By Proposition 3, xk+1i = x
k+1
i (θ̂
k+1
i , 
k) is a continuous
function of (θ̂k+1i , 
k), and xk+1i (θ
∗, 0) = x∗. Therefore, xk+1i → x∗ a.s. as k →∞.
Proof of Lemma 7: (a) Strict monotonicity of F (x) is implied by the positive definiteness of
the Jacobian ∇F (x). This is given by ∇F (x) = J1 + J2 + J3, where J2 = 2b∗σXσ−1eeT and
J1 =

c′′1(x1)
. . .
c′′N(xN)
 and , J3 = b∗σ(σ−1)Xσ−2

X
σ−1 + x1 . . . x1
... . . .
...
xN . . .
X
σ−1 + xN
 . Since
ci(xi) is a convex function in xi for all i, J1 is a positive semidefinite matrix. J2, compactly stated
as 2b∗σXσ−1eeT , is also a positive semidefinite matrix. As a consequence, positive definiteness
of ∇F (x) follows from the diagonal dominance of the following matrix:
b∗σ(σ − 1)Xσ−2

X
σ−1 + x1 . . .
1
2
(x1 + xN)
... . . .
...
1
2
(xN + x1) . . .
X
σ−1 + xN
 .
By a minor rearrangement, it suffices to show the diagonal dominance of the following:
b∗σ(σ − 1)Xσ−2

X−1
σ−1 + (1 +
1
(σ−1))x1 . . .
1
2
(x1 + xN)
... . . .
...
1
2
(xN + x1) . . .
X−N
σ−1 + (1 +
1
(σ−1))xN
 ,
where X−j ,
∑
i 6=j xi. The result follows by noting that(
1 +
1
(σ − 1)
)
>
(N − 1)
2
or
2σ
σ − 1 > N − 1 or N <
3σ − 1
σ − 1 ,
and 1
(σ−1) ≥ 12 or 1 < σ ≤ 3. (b) For x, y ∈ K, (x− y)T (F (x)− F (y)) =
∫ 1
0
(x− y)T∇F (y +
α(x−y))(x−y)dα. Let x˜ = y+α(x−y) an X˜ = ∑Ni=1 x˜i. Akin to ∇F (x), ∇F (y+α(x−y)) =
J˜1 + J˜2 + J˜3, where J˜1 and J˜2 are positive semidefinite, and J˜3 = b∗σ(σ − 1)X˜σ−2J˜4, where
J˜4 =

X˜−1
σ−1 + (1 +
1
(σ−1))x˜1 . . .
1
2
(x˜1 + x˜N)
... . . .
...
1
2
(x˜N + x˜1) . . .
X˜−N
σ−1 + (1 +
1
(σ−1))x˜N

=

X˜−1
σ−1 +
N−1
2
x˜1 . . .
1
2
(x˜1 + x˜N)
... . . .
...
1
2
(x˜N + x˜1) . . .
X˜−N
σ−1 +
N−1
2
x˜N
+
(
σ
σ − 1 −
N − 1
2
)
IN , J˜5 + ρIN ,
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where J˜5 is a positive semidefinite matrix and ρ = (1 + 1σ−1 − N−12 ) > 0. Therefore,
(x− y)T (F (x)− F (y)) ≥
∫ 1
0
(x− y)T J˜3(x− y)dα ≥ b∗σ(σ − 1)
∫ 1
0
(x− y)T X˜σ−2J˜4(x− y)dα
≥ b∗σ(σ − 1)ησ−2
∫ 1
0
(x− y)T (J˜5 + ρIN)(x− y)dα ≥ b∗σ(σ − 1)ησ−2ρ‖x− y‖2,
implying the strong monotonicity of F .
Proof of Corollary 1: By Proposition 3, it suffices to show that F (x; θ) is Lipschitz continuous
in x for all θ ∈ Θ. For θ ∈ Θ, and x, y ∈ K, we have that
‖F (x; θ)− F (y; θ)‖ =
∥∥∥∥∫ 1
0
∇F (y + α(x− y); θ)(x− y)dα
∥∥∥∥ for some α ∈ (0, 1)
≤
∫ 1
0
‖∇F (y + α(x− y); θ)‖ ‖x− y‖dα ≤
∫ 1
0
r‖x− y‖dα = r‖x− y‖,
which implies the Lipschitz continuity in x of the mapping F .
Proof of Proposition 4: By Lemma 7, F (x; θ) is a strongly monotone mapping over K for
all θ ∈ Θ. By definition of F , F (x; θ) is Lipschitz continuous in θ for all x ∈ K. By definition
of ∇F and boundedness of x ∈ K, ∇F (x; θ) is bounded for x ∈ K and θ ∈ Θ. Then, the
conclusion follows from Corollary 1.
Proof of Proposition 5: Given p, θ¯i, i and k, let H(zi) denote the Jacobian matrix ∇F (zi)
of the mapping F at zi ∈ Z˜ . Then, as in Proposition 1, it suffices to show that H(zi) is a
P-matrix for all zi ∈ Z˜ . Given zi ∈ Z˜ , let H = H(zi). Then, H = H(zi) =
 Ai B
Ci D
,
where Ai = σb∗(Xi)σ−2
[
Xi(I + ee
T ) + (σ − 1)xieT
]
+Ei, B = − 1k+1e, Ci = −σb∗(Xi)σ−1eT ,
and D = 1
k+1
, where Xi =
∑N
j=1 xij , xi = (x11, . . . , x1N)
T , and Ei is an N×N diagonal matrix
with c′′j (xij) as its jth diagonal entry. It suffices to show that H is a P-matrix when Ei = 0.
If N < 3σ−1
σ−1 , then Ai is positive semidefinite by Lemma 7. Therefore, we only consider
the principal submatrix Hα of H , where α ⊆ {1, . . . , N} is a nonempty index set, and Hα , Aα Bα
Cα D
 , where Aα = σb∗(Xi)σ−1 [Inα + enα(enα)T ]+σ(σ−1)b∗(Xi)σ−2xα(enα)T , Bα =
− 1
k+1
enα , Cα = −σb∗(Xi)σ−1(enα)T , and Inα and enα denote the identity matrix and the column
of ones in Rnα×nα and Rnα , respectively, with nα = |α|. Since
BαD
−1Cα =
1
k + 1
enα(k + 1)σb∗(Xi)σ−1(enα)T = σb∗(Xi)σ−1enα(enα)T ,
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it follows that Aα − BαD−1Cα = σb∗(Xi)σ−1Inα + σ(σ − 1)b∗(Xi)σ−2xα(enα)T , which is a
sum of a diagonal positive definite matrix and a P0-matrix, and thus is a P-matrix. Therefore,
det(Hα) = det(D) det(Aα−BαD−1Cα) > 0 for all α ⊆ {1, . . . , N} with α 6= ∅, which implies
that H is a P-matrix.
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